Problem

LocalFileManagerDriver._full_path() (griptape/drivers/file_manager/local_file_manager_driver.py:52) contains two path traversal vectors that allow an AI agent to read or write arbitrary files outside the configured workdir:

Vector 1 — Absolute path bypass:

full_path = path if os.path.isabs(path) else os.path.join(self.workdir, path.lstrip("/"))

If path = "/etc/passwd", os.path.isabs() returns True and full_path = "/etc/passwd" — the workdir is completely skipped.

Vector 2 — .. traversal via normpath:
../../../etc/passwd is not absolute, so it joins with workdir: /workdir/../../../etc/passwd. os.path.normpath() then resolves .. sequences, producing /etc/passwd — outside the workdir with no boundary check.

Exploit scenario: An adversarial document processed by a griptape agent can use prompt injection to instruct the LLM to call FileManagerTool.load_files_from_disk with a traversal path, leaking SSH private keys, .env files, AWS credentials, or other sensitive files.

Confirmed by test:

import os
workdir = '/tmp/safe'
for path in ['/etc/passwd', '../../../etc/passwd']:
    full = path if os.path.isabs(path) else os.path.join(workdir, path.lstrip('/'))
    full = os.path.normpath(full)
    print(f'{path!r} → {full!r}')  # both resolve to /etc/passwd

Severity: High (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N — 8.7)

Fix

Remove the isabs short-circuit so all paths go through os.path.join(workdir, path.lstrip('/')), then add a realpath-based boundary check:

def _full_path(self, path: str) -> str:
    full_path = os.path.join(self.workdir, path.lstrip("/"))
    ended_with_sep = path.endswith("/")
    full_path = os.path.normpath(full_path)
    workdir_real = os.path.realpath(self.workdir)
    full_path_real = os.path.realpath(full_path)
    if not (full_path_real == workdir_real or full_path_real.startswith(workdir_real + os.sep)):
        raise ValueError(f"Path {path!r} resolves outside the working directory {self.workdir!r}")
    if ended_with_sep:
        full_path = full_path.rstrip("/") + "/"
    return full_path

Test Plan

• Existing test suite passes
• _full_path("/etc/passwd") raises ValueError (was: returned /etc/passwd)
• _full_path("../../../etc/passwd") raises ValueError (was: returned /etc/passwd)
• _full_path("uploads/file.txt") returns <workdir>/uploads/file.txt (no regression)
• _full_path("subdir/") returns <workdir>/subdir/ with trailing slash preserved

Security Note

Severity: High. Exploitable via prompt injection in any griptape agent that uses FileManagerTool with LocalFileManagerDriver (the default). Filed via GitHub Private Vulnerability Reporting.